

## The Middle Class Identity: Implicit Racial Priming Revisited

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While they shy away from referencing whites by name, politicians across the partisan divide have referenced the middle class identity in their campaign appeals. Yet given that the middle class identity has until recently connoted white identity in the United States, it is possible that when used as a campaign appeal, the middle class may serve as a code word for whiteness, functioning like an implicit racial prime. To explore whether this may be the case, I revisit the traditional implicit-explicit model of racial priming to explore 1) whether appeals to the majority racial in-group and an implicit code word for this group serve as racial primes and 2) whether it is possible to prime, explicitly and implicitly, racial considerations *other than* racial resentment. I argue that appeals to both the middle class identity and to white identity can serve as implicit and explicit racial primes, respectively. More particularly, these references will prime citizens to consider their affect toward and linked fate with Whites, and also the importance of their own White identity, when forming opinions about the proposed policy, with support increasing when respondents encounter an implicit appeal and decreasing with an explicit appeal. I present the results of three experiments – aired on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk – to explore whether such references do indeed serve as racial primes of opinion about three distinct policy areas (tax cuts, job training, and retirement planning). Results suggest the potential efficacy of the middle class identity as an implicit racial prime while also demonstrating that a reference to white race serves to prime respondents to consider their own white identities. I conclude that appeals to majority in-groups can indeed serve as racial primes of sentiments *other than* racial resentment, which merits more experimental exploration.

During the 2016 Presidential election, racial tensions rose once again to reach the campaign as Donald Trump entered the race. During the announcement of his candidacy, Trump disparaged Mexican immigrants, claiming that “They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.”<sup>1</sup> Yet while the Trump campaign did indeed make disparaging remarks about immigrants and racial minorities in the United States, it nevertheless avoided using explicitly pro-white rhetoric throughout the race. Given the norm of racial equality in the United States, Trump’s avoidance of pro-white language is typical of candidates for political office, who seek to avoid alienating large swathes of voters finding that sort of language repugnant.

That same norm of racial equality has led scholars to contend that explicit racial priming – using explicitly negative and pejorative language to cue white voters’ feelings of racial resentment, which they bring to bear on political evaluations – is ineffective as a campaign strategy to mobilize voters. However, prior work has focused exclusively on language evidencing racial animus toward minorities, using racial resentment as the primary measure of such sentiment. Is it possible that an appeal to the majority in-group – whites – similarly alienates voters’ support? Or are there circumstances when an appeal to whites can be an effective racial prime? Moreover, given an explicit appeal to white racial identity, is it possible to prime racial considerations *other than* racial resentment, including, for example, in-group racial affect?

Using a series of three survey experiments, I demonstrate that an appeal to white racial identity does indeed serve as an explicit racial prime. In other words, respondents consider the importance of their own white identity, for example, when they encounter a reference to white

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<sup>1</sup> The transcript of this televised speech is available from [Time Magazine](#).

racial identity in a campaign context. Unsurprisingly, though the reference serves as an explicit racial prime, it does not mobilize respondents' support for the fictitious policy proposal with one notable exception: as respondents place greater valuation on their own white identities, their likelihood of support for the policy increases. These findings demonstrate that it is possible to prime racial considerations other than resentment, which has heretofore gone relatively unexplored, and thereby introduces a new area of investigation to the implicit-explicit priming debate.

### **Racial Priming: Worth Re-visiting?**

The media, candidates for office, and even political campaigns as a whole can serve to prime voters – to alter the sorts of criteria they use to make political decisions and evaluations (Domke, 2001; Druckman & Holmes, 2004; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Miller & Krosnick, 2000; Scheufele, 2000; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007; Weaver, 2007). Primes are words, phrases, and even images that change the standards, criteria, attitudes, and issues people use to make political assessments (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Scheufele, 2000; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007; Weaver, 2007).<sup>2</sup> Primes bring forth certain evaluative criteria in the mind of citizens, rendering these criteria more likely to be accessed in forming opinion (Druckman & Holmes, 2004; Graber & Smith, 2005; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Weaver, 2007). Priming therefore involves making certain attitudes readily accessible from the memory (Miller & Krosnick, 2000; Scheufele, 2000; Scheufele & Iyengar, 2014; Taylor & Fiske, 1978; Weaver, 2007; Zaller, 1992) thereby simplifying decision making by creating cognitive shortcuts (schemas, to Valentino (1999) or heuristics, to Krosnick and Kinder (1990)).

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<sup>2</sup> To be clear, though persuasion is often the objective of priming, priming alters the criteria citizens use to evaluate while persuasion changes the evaluation itself (Druckman and Holmes 2004).

Some of these criteria and considerations can – and do – include race; indeed, citizens exhibit a vulnerability to racial primes, bringing racial sentiment and resentment to bear not only on evaluations of ostensibly racial policy, but to non-racial policy as well (Domke, 2001; Mendelberg, 2001; Valentino, 1999; Valentino, Hutchings, & White, 2002). Scholars have demonstrated that racial cues – code words – serve as primes, either implicitly or explicitly (leading to the IE model of racial priming; see for example Mendelberg (2001) and Huber and Lapinski (2006)). *Implicit* cues highlight issues associated with racial groups, and are not explicitly derogatory or stereotypical if they are to be effective, as they provide the politicians with plausible deniability of violating any norm of racial equality (Hutchings & Jardina, 2009; Lopez, 2014; Mendelberg, 2001; Valentino, 1999; Valentino et al., 2002). For example, terms like “inner city” increase the impact of negative racial predispositions on relevant political opinions (Domke, 2001; Druckman & Holmes, 2004; Druckman, Jacobs, & Ostermeier, 2004; Kam, 2007; Klar, 2013; Krosnick & Kinder, 1990; Mendelberg, 2001; Soss, Fording, & Schram, 2011; Tesler, 2012; Valentino, 1999; Valentino et al., 2002) and can thus serve as an implicit racial prime.

Implicit racial appeals stand in contrast to explicit racial appeals, or words that make a direct reference to race, generally in a derogatory manner. Some scholars contend that explicit racial appeals are less effective than implicit appeals (Mendelberg, 2001; Valentino et al., 2002), while others contend that while both implicit and explicit appeals are equally ineffective, voters tend to reject appeals with explicit racial content altogether (Huber & Lapinski, 2006). Still more scholars have found that while voters may recognize racial animus in campaign communications, they are no longer disturbed by the language (Valentino, Neuner, & Vandenbroek, 2017).

Regardless of whether priming was studied via images of different races (Terkildsen (1993), Nelson and Kinder (Nelson & Kinder, 1996), and Valentino (1999)) or code words (Valentino, Neuner, and Vandebroek (2017) and White (2007)), scholars have focused on white respondents' feelings of resentment or antipathy toward racial minorities. Scholars have not yet devote equal attention to the potential efficacy of implicit or explicit racial cues that invoke neutral or positive images of the majority racial in-groups: whites.

This oversight is important to explore, as in-group processes are an important component of social identity. Indeed, the power of in-group identity is the result of one's acknowledgment of a certain characteristic, and an extension of one's sense of self to envelop others; in other words, a commonality – such as white racial identity – is an in-group factor worthy of examination (Petrow, Transue, & Vercellotti, 2017). Valentino, Neuner, and Vandebroek ((2017)) connect racial group identity to the notion of entativity, or the idea that one belongs to a coherent, unified collective. Increases in entativity have observable implications on behavior (Converse, 1964; Stephens-Dougan, 2016; Valentino, 1999). It is therefore plausible that racial cues referencing white identity may prime respondents' feelings about and identification with the group.

What sort of language may serve as an implicit or explicit prime of white race? The latter is most straightforward: a reference to “whites” or “Caucasians” will serve as an explicit racial appeal in political communication.<sup>3</sup> It is less straightforward to determine what may serve as an implicit racial cue connoting white identity. However, a reference to the middle class is likely to connote whiteness given the racialized political economy of the United States. Whites have enjoyed power and privilege – and opportunities to succeed – in America's racialized political economy, which have translated over time into race-based socioeconomic inequality

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<sup>3</sup> I chose to use both of these descriptors in different experiments simply to see if respondents would react with equal distaste to the more outdated “Caucasian” as they did to “white.”

(Grosfoguel, 2004; Marable, 2015). Additionally, as Americans have a tendency to link race and class (Ortner, 1998), there is ubiquitous media representation of the middle class as white (Feagin, 2010; Kendall, 2011; Lipsitz, 1990; Rains, 1998). Thus, an appeal to the middle class may drive respondents to connect, at an implicit level, the class group and white identity, and may serve as a counterpoint to explicit racial language invoking white racial identity.

### **Priming Racial Considerations: Beyond Racial Resentment**

Just as racially coded language making appeals to the majority racial in-group have gone underexplored (though see Lopez (2014)), so too have racial considerations other than racial resentment. Prior surveys exploring priming effects have asked respondents about the notion that Blacks are demanding and undeserving of government assistance – in other words, negative stereotypes that activate group sentiment and come to bear on decision-making (Nelson & Kinder, 1996; Stephens-Dougan, 2016; Valentino et al., 2002, 2017). Scholars have measured it with a battery of items measuring agreement with statements about people of color (see, for example, Feldman and Huddy 2005; Kinder and Sanders 1996). However, political scientists have demonstrated that the racial resentment index means different things to, for example, white liberals and conservatives, and does not necessarily capture other potentially important racial considerations (Feldman & Huddy, 2005; Wilson & Davis, 2011). Most importantly, racial resentment has to do with animus and prejudice toward different racial *outgroups* (Jardina, 2014); as such, it fails to consider respondents' (potentially positive) feelings about and connection to their own racial group(s).

It follows that racial cueing of the majority in-group – whites – may prime other sorts of racial considerations. These considerations – affect toward whites, linked fate with whites, and white identity – are distinct but interrelated concepts that differ from those explored by other

scholars. These considerations were chosen because they measure both individual and relational aspects of in-group identity (Jardina, 2014). In other words, the measures capture both respondents' ideas about their *own* racial group-based identities as well as how they relate to the same group in society. Additionally, the considerations tap both the cognitive and affective components of identity; in other words, these considerations capture identification as a white *individual*, the importance of this self-identification, and identification *with whites* as a group (Citrin & Sears, 2009; Jardina, 2014; Klandermans, Sabucedo, Rodriguez, & De Weerd, 2002). Finally, the measures also capture feelings about whites (as a group). Taken together, these measures offer alternative racial considerations to resentment that may become accessible when respondents experience racial cues of white race.

Borrowing from the American National Election Studies, I define *affect* toward whites as feelings about (affect toward) whites as a racial group. In other words, how warmly does one feel about whites in society? *Linked fate* with whites has less to do with feelings about the group, but instead with understandings of the relationship between an individual and whites in society. Linked fate is the idea that the status or change in circumstances of others (namely, members of a certain racial group) is a good indication of one's own situation and prospects (Dawson 1994).<sup>4</sup> This consideration captures a relationship between respondents and societal whites (or, their identification *with* whites, capturing a group dynamic of identity. Though linked fate has not been available as a time series variable on the ANES, it was included on the 2012 face-to-face interview, and provides insight into Americans' sense of connection to their own and other racial

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<sup>4</sup> While the concept of linked fate certainly applies to gender and religious groups, for example, Dawson focused on this relationship as one of political solidarity among Blacks (Gandy Jr., 2001; Gay, 2004).

groups.<sup>5</sup> Prior research has demonstrated that both racial and class linked fate measures are robust for experimental manipulation on large, nationally representative surveys and MTurk samples (Gay, Hochschild, and White 2016). As such, it allows for further insight into respondents' sense of connectedness to their own racial group.

Finally, *white identity* is one's own consciousness and valuation of one's whiteness as a component of who they are. Ashley Jardina (2014) makes a compelling case for treating white identity and linked fate with whites (among white respondents) as distinct concepts. Entativity implies the possibility that whites hold a strong psychological attachment to their *own* racial group inform the use of this measure, which captures the cognitive component of identity (Jardina, 2014; Valentino et al., 2017).<sup>6</sup> Nonetheless, linked fate focuses on a sense of connection to racial groups (one's own *or* others), while white identity has more to do with one's perception and valuation of his own racial group as a part of his unique identity. This measure may help to gain leverage on whether a racially coded reference drives respondents to consider their own whiteness.

## **Expectations**

If appeals to either the middle class or white race do indeed change citizen behavior, opinion about a fictitious policy proposal will also change as a function of hearing this appeal. Three survey experiments facilitate exploration of the potential efficacy of both identities as racial primes. Each experiment divided respondents into three groups – a control group, a treatment group hearing a policy discussion referencing the potential implicit racial prime (the

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<sup>5</sup> Linked fate questions were included on the 2012 ANES. For example, the following question was asked of face-to-face respondents to the ANES in 2012: "Do you think that what happens generally to white people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?"

<sup>6</sup> Please see the work of Ashley Jardina (2014) for an in-depth discussion of the measure of white identity. Jardina's work makes the case that the measure is different from racial resentment, and predicts political preferences in a number of domains.

middle class), and a treatment group hearing a policy discussion referencing the explicit racial prime (white identity). If the identities serve as racial primes, respondents will bring racial considerations to bear more strongly on their decisions to support or oppose a policy than will respondents in a control group.

There are two phenomena to explore: first, the impact of racial appeals on respondents' policy opinions and second, whether that reference serves as a racial prime. With respect to the former, respondents experiencing an implicit racial appeal will offer more *support* for the proposed policy than will respondents in the control group, given the identity's positive connotations. Contrastingly, respondents hearing an appeal to whites will *oppose* the policy more than respondents in the control group given the explicit racial nature of the appeal. Respondents to surveys tend to reject explicit racial appeals outright; though not necessarily negative or pejorative in nature (like a racial slur)<sup>7</sup>, an appeal to white identity is nonetheless an explicit message because it is a racial noun that makes the audience aware of the racial nature of the appeal (Huber & Lapinski, 2006; Mendelberg, 2001, 2008). Respondents exposed to a policy discussion involving the majority racial in-group will therefore oppose the policy more than respondents in the control group because the appeal the norm of racial equality by invoking, directly, the majority racial in-group advantaged by the United States' racialized political economy.

Regardless of whether the appeals influence support or opposition to the policy, they may nonetheless serve as implicit or explicit racial primes. With respect to priming, if a reference to the middle class identity functions as an implicit *prime* of citizens' racial considerations, these

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<sup>7</sup> The work of Tali Mendelberg defines explicit racial messages as those making "racial content obvious by using categorical racial nouns" (2008, 110). Her work focuses almost exclusively on *negative* or *pejorative* explicit messages, though the definition does not necessarily exclude neutral explicit appeals.

considerations will exert a stronger influence on support for the policy when interacted with the implicit treatment condition than in the control group; the same phenomenon holds for white identity as an explicit racial prime. This influence is measured as the interaction between treatment group and a racial consideration, and therefore captures the joint influence of both the racial prime and racial consideration on support; because it accounts for both treatment group effects *and* the impact of a racial evaluative criterion, the measure moves beyond capturing merely enthusiasm for the middle class or white identities.

It is possible that a middle class appeal may serve as an implicit racial prime, but the effect is likely to be weaker than the effect of the explicit racial prime. After hearing a reference to the middle class identity, respondents may be more likely to consider their feelings toward whites or their own white identity when evaluating the policy, leading to a generally more positive opinion on the policy. If the identity holds no racial meaning, it should not prime attitudes about whites at all; if it does, the interaction of any of the racial considerations with this treatment condition will have a stronger influence on support for policy than when interacted with the control group.

Contrastingly, respondents hearing a reference to white identity are extremely likely to consider perhaps their feelings toward whites, but most certainly the importance of their own identity when evaluating the policy. In general, respondents receiving the explicit appeal will oppose the policy (in contrast to respondents in the other experimental groups) – except when their own valuation of their white identity is high. In these circumstances, respondents will offer strong support for the policy, perhaps even more support than respondents in the other two treatment groups. Finally, it is unlikely that either set of primes will lead respondents to consider

their linked fate with other whites – cognitively, it may be a harder evaluation to make than about one’s personal identity (white identity) or their feelings (affect toward whites).

### **Data and Methodology**

This priming experiment derived from the work of Tali Mendelberg (2001). Mendelberg sought to demonstrate that implicit racial cues do indeed racialize the opinions of white Americans; terms like “inner city” proved to be implicit racial primes of antipathy toward Blacks. Thus, Mendelberg’s “IE model” focuses on whether implicitly (and explicitly) *negative* racial messages activate racial resentment. Mendelberg’s findings indicate that racial attitudes will be active in respondents’ memories in the presence of implicit racial cues, but that respondents will avoid expressing these attitudes in the presence of explicit racial cues (Mendelberg, 2001; Valentino et al., 2017).

While I borrow from her work, my experiment differs in important ways. I include a control group in my experiment, which allows for comparison of the effects not only of different racial messages, but the effects of both the implicit or explicit message relative to a piece of communication that does not invoke race (Huber & Lapinski, 2006). Additionally, I employ two ostensibly value-neutral group identities as opposed to explicitly negative language. I employ the “middle class” – which, like “inner city,” may have an implicit racial association despite not being a racial noun – as an analogue for the implicit condition of her experiment. For the explicit condition, I use a more obvious racial noun (“Caucasian” or “white,” alternatively) in place of the derogatory language in Mendelberg’s experiment.

Given that neither the middle class nor white identity are inherently derogatory terms, I do not focus not on whether this language primes *racial resentment*. While racial resentment is an important component of racial identity, questions measuring the construct do not ask

respondents to indicate the importance of their *own* race to their conceptions of themselves or, more specifically, as a component of their identity. As such, it fails to explore white respondents' feelings about their *own* race (as opposed to their feelings toward *other* races) and other in-group processes. As I am interested in whether references to the middle class and white identities prime considerations about one's own whiteness (as opposed to considerations about *other* racial groups), I avoid this measure. Consequently, I restrict the analysis to white respondents, and examine whether value-neutral racial message activate considerations about whiteness – affect toward whites, feelings of linked fate with whites, and white identity – that are not inherently negative. These considerations provide a sharper understanding of implicit and explicit racial messages conveying whiteness and their potential influence political decision-making.

Three survey experiment conducted on Amazon's Mechanical Turk<sup>8</sup> enabled this exploration of implicit and explicit racial priming. Amazon's Mechanical Turk is an online platform for recruiting and paying subjects to complete tasks (Berinsky et al. 2012). It provides an alternative method of subject recruitment for social scientists – for example, scholars may turn to MTurk instead of employing a convenience sample of college students. Research has demonstrated the utility and reliability of MTurk samples, finding them to be more demographically diverse than convenience samples (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Hersh & Schaffner, 2011).

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<sup>8</sup> For more information on the process of using MTurk, please see its [website](#) or work by Berinsky et al. (2012).

**Table 1: Experimental Conditions**

Imagine a politician campaigning for office came to your door to discuss some important issues. The politician says to you,

	Tax Cuts	Jobs	Education
Control	"The economy is still struggling. I support tax cuts because they are good for economic growth."	"To be prepared for tomorrow's economy, many Americans will need to obtain new knowledge and skills. I support new job training programs that will help keep American workers competitive."	"The economy is still struggling. I support giving parents funds for education so they can send their children to the schools of their choice."
Implicit	The economy is still struggling. I support middle class tax cuts because they are good for economic growth."	"To be prepared for tomorrow's economy, many Americans, especially in the middle class, will need to obtain new knowledge and skills. I support new job training programs that will help keep middle-class American workers competitive."	"The economy is still struggling. I support giving middle class parents funds for education so they can send their children to the schools of their choice."
Explicit	"The economy is still struggling. I support tax cuts for Caucasians because they are good for economic growth."	"To be prepared for tomorrow's economy, many Americans, especially whites, will need to obtain new knowledge and skills. I support new job training programs that will help keep white American workers competitive."	"The economy is still struggling. I support giving White parents funds for education so they can send their children to the schools of their choice."

For the experimental component of the survey, respondents were randomly sorted into a control group, implicit treatment group (with “middle class” serving as the implicit language), or

explicit treatment experimental group (with “Caucasian” or “white” serving as the explicit racial phrase – see Table 1, above). Each respondent read a fictitious conversation with an imaginary political candidate wherein the politician made a claim and stated a policy position. In the experimental groups, the politician would link support for the policy to either the middle class or to Caucasians/whites.

Before offering their opinions on the policy, respondents participated in an attention check about the substance of the policy; eliminating respondents who answered this question incorrectly provides some protection against respondent inattentiveness. Respondents then indicated their level of *support* for the policy; this support is the central variable used to assess the potential efficacy of racial priming. Specifically, respondents were asked to indicate whether they strongly supported, somewhat supported, somewhat opposed, or strongly opposed the aforementioned policy.

The interaction of each racial consideration and each treatment group will serve to indicate whether the middle class and white identities serve as implicit or explicit racial primes, respectively. The interaction allows for the joint influence of the prime and racial consideration on support, and allows for cross-conditional comparison in priming effects. If the references serve as racial primes, the racial considerations will have a stronger impact on support for the proposed policy when interacted with these treatment groups than with the control group. The statistical model for these expectations – borrowed and modified from the work of Valentino et al. (2017)– are a straightforward regression of support for the policy on the experimental conditions, the racial considerations, and the interaction between each:

$$Y = B_0 + B_1(\text{Implicit Group}) + B_2(\text{Explicit Group}) + B_3(\text{Racial Consideration}) + B_4(\text{Racial Consideration} * \text{Implicit Group}) + B_5(\text{Racial Consideration} * \text{Explicit Group}) + e.$$

In this model, the base experimental group for comparison is the control group. The control group was chosen as a base to allow for the exploration of the potential efficacy of language referencing whites as either an implicit or explicit racial prime of considerations *other than* racial resentment. Future work employing Valentino et al.'s original model is necessary to explore the efficacy of implicit priming relative to explicit priming.<sup>9</sup>

But what of the different racial considerations that political discussion may prime? For my racial consideration variables, I asked respondents to evaluate their *affect toward whites* and *linked fate with whites*. Respondents indicated their feelings of warmth toward whites using a feeling thermometer ranging from zero (very cold feelings) to 100 (very warm feelings). Respondents also noted the strength of their linked fate with whites on a seven-point scale; larger numbers indicated that respondents had a stronger sense of connection.

Finally, I asked respondents two questions about racial group identity and consciousness: "How important is being white to your identity?" and "How important is it that whites work together to change laws that are unfair to whites?" Jardina (2014) demonstrates the utility of the first question; the second question was included for analysis to tap whites' ideas not only about their identity, but of their notion that their identity faces threat or disadvantage worthy of redress (Jardina, 2014; Valentino et al., 2017). For this analysis, I present only the first measure, as pioneered by Jardina. The white identity variable captures respondents' feelings about their own racial identities (as opposed to my other racial conscious variables, which ask respondents to

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<sup>9</sup> Valentino, Neuner, and Vandebroek (2017) compare an implicit prime and control against the explicit prime to assess the efficacy of explicit compared to implicit priming.

assess racial groups); specifically, it measures respondents' valuation of whiteness as a component of their identity.<sup>10</sup>

### **Background of Respondents**

Each survey asked respondents a series of racial consideration evaluations and demographic questions (as well as a distractor task) before they received an experimental treatment.<sup>11</sup> Table 2 (below) presents respondent demographics for each survey. In each survey, respondents were fairly evenly split with respect to gender, and on the whole, respondents tended not to be senior citizens. Similarly, close to 40% of respondents in each survey had completed a four-year college program. As is typical with MTurk surveys, respondents tended to be more ideological liberal than conservative, with more Democrats than Republicans.

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<sup>10</sup> More information on the variable's creation may be found in the appendix.

<sup>11</sup> Full questionnaires are available from the author.

**Table 2. Respondent Demographics by Survey**

	<i>Tax Cuts</i>	<i>Jobs</i>	<i>Education</i>
N	713	983	968
Gender	709	976	960
Male	43.58%	46.72%	57.60%
Female	56.42%	53.28%	42.40%
Age	713	983	968
18-30	30.43%	31.03%	38.33%
31-44	37.73%	41.51%	42.36%
45-65	28.33%	23.70%	16.63%
65+	3.51%	3.76%	2.69%
Education	713	983	968
No HS	0.56%	0.81%	0.31%
HS Grad	9.82%	9.66%	9.19%
Some College	21.04%	24.01%	22.52%
2 Year College	12.34%	12.31%	9.81%
4 Year College	37.59%	37.84%	42.98%
Postgrad	18.65%	15.36%	15.19%
Ideology	704	973	958
Very Liberal	12.22%	16.44%	18.58%
Liberal	28.55%	32.68%	31.52%
Moderate	30.82%	21.58%	23.59%
Conservative	19.60%	21.79%	20.46%
Very Conservative	8.81%	7.50%	5.85%
Party	694	967	955
Strong Democrat	19.16%	22.23%	22.09%
Lean Democrat	21.04%	24.92%	25.76%
Independent	27.38%	24.61%	24.29%
Lean Republican	19.45%	16.75%	19.16%
Strong Republican	12.97%	11.48%	8.69%

Table 3 (below) presents respondents' average racial considerations and alongside the number of respondents who completed each evaluation for each survey. Respondents generally felt warmly toward whites, rating them in the low seventies on a feeling thermometer ranging from 0 to 100. Linked fate could range from 1 to 7; respondents indicated moderately high

feelings of linked fate with other whites. Finally, respondents had middling valuation of white identity.

**Table 3: Respondents’ Racial Considerations**

	<i>Tax Cuts</i>	<i>Jobs</i>	<i>Education</i>
Affect toward whites	75.54	72.52	71
N	712	983	968
Linked fate with whites	5.12	5.17	4.84
N	713	983	968
White identity	2.73	2.29	2.42
N	709	983	968

### **The Impact of Implicit and Explicit Racial Messages on Support**

Before examining the whether references to the middle class or to white identity serve as racial primes, it is first essential to determine whether such identity-based references do indeed impact support for a set of fictitious policies. In other words, does support for the policy (the dependent variable) vary with experimental group (the independent variable)? It appears so. Table 4 (below) presents the results of an ordinary least squares regression of support for the fictitious policy. Following Wallsten et al. (2017), I have transformed the support variable to range from 0 (strong opposition) to 1 (strong support).<sup>12</sup> Support among respondents receiving the implicit racial prime is statistically significantly different from support among respondents in the control group in two of three policy areas (tax cuts and jobs), though the directionality varies. Across all three substantive policy areas, respondents receiving the explicit racial prime are statistically significantly less likely to support the policy than are respondents in the control group, as evidenced by the strong, negative coefficients.

<sup>12</sup> This scoring facilitates presentation via standardized coefficients. All analyses were also conducted using ordered logistic regression to account for variation in support. Results are available in the appendix.

**Table 4: Respondent Support for Policy**

	<i>Tax Cuts</i>	<i>Jobs</i>	<i>Education</i>
Implicit Treatment	0.06*	-0.04*	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Explicit Treatment	-0.30***	-0.25***	-0.12***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.56***	0.75***	0.51***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Observations	710	981	966
R2	0.24	0.17	0.04
P	0.00	0.00	0.00

\* $p \leq 0.05$ , \*\* $p \leq 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p \leq 0.001$ .

Note: Standard errors are displayed in coefficients

There is thus preliminary evidence that collectively, respondents in the implicit treatment group react more positively to the policy than respondents in the control group, while respondents in the explicit treatment group react more negatively toward both the policy and the politician proposing it. Recall, however, that the main argument is not about these preliminary effects, and is instead about the potential interactive effects that exist between treatment groups and racial considerations. Therefore, models must account for racial considerations like affect toward whites, linked fate with whites, and white identity to assess the efficacy of the middle class as a racial prime.

### **Implicit Racial Priming: Mixed Preliminary Evidence**

Does the middle class identity serve as a *prime* of racial considerations, and if so, which ones? When considering support for the politician, results indicate that the middle class identity does indeed prime affect toward whites. Table 5, below, presents the results of an ordinary least squares regression using the scaled support variable; the interactive effect of the implicit treatment condition and affect toward whites is statistically significant – this is to say that the effect of affect toward whites has a stronger influence on respondents in the implicit treatment

condition than on those in the control condition. In other words, the middle class identity does indeed serve to prime a racial consideration when respondents evaluate taxation policy.


Though the interactive effect is statistically significant, it is not easily interpretable because it is an interaction term; further, it does not provide a detailed snapshot of the relationship between the influence of affect toward whites and support at differing levels of affect or among the different treatment groups. Again following Wallsten et al. (2017), I instead present marginal effects of an ordinary least squares regression using the scaled support measure to explore trends in support given treatment condition and levels of affect toward whites. Figure 1 (below) presents the probability of supporting the policy given a respondent's affect toward whites and treatment group. Given their affect toward whites, respondents exposed to the middle class prime had higher likelihoods of support than do respondents in the control group when their feelings toward whites are cold or lukewarm; the opinions of respondents in these two groups converged as their feelings toward whites grew very warm, fully overlapping at an affect level of above 90.

**Table 5: Support for Policy, Controlling for Racial Considerations**

	Affect Toward Whites			Linked Fate with Whites			White Identity		
	<i>Tax Cuts</i>	<i>Jobs</i>	<i>Education</i>	<i>Tax Cuts</i>	<i>Jobs</i>	<i>Education</i>	<i>Tax Cuts</i>	<i>Jobs</i>	<i>Education</i>
Implicit Treatment	0.30** (0.10)	-0.08 (0.07)	0.07 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.06)	0.02 (0.07)	0.06 (0.06)	-0.08* (0.04)	-0.07 (0.05)
Explicit Treatment	-0.21* (0.10)	-0.33*** (0.07)	-0.08 (0.08)	-0.37*** (0.09)	-0.25*** (0.06)	-0.23*** (0.07)	-0.47*** (0.06)	-0.42*** (0.04)	-0.28*** (0.05)
Racial Consideration	0.00** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Interaction: Racial Consideration and Implicit Treatment	-0.00** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Interaction: Racial Consideration and Explicit Treatment	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)
Constant	0.35*** (0.07)	0.70*** (0.05)	0.36*** (0.05)	0.58*** (0.06)	0.71*** (0.04)	0.46*** (0.05)	0.51*** (0.04)	0.80*** (0.03)	0.51*** (0.03)
Observations	709	981	966	710	981	966	708	981	966
R2	0.26	0.18	0.06	0.24	0.17	0.05	0.28	0.19	0.07
P	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

\* $p \leq 0.05$ , \*\* $p \leq 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p \leq 0.001$ .

Note: OLS Standard Errors are displayed in parentheses.



**Figure 1: Respondent Support for Tax Cut Policy Given Affect Toward Whites**


Importantly, the middle class only serves as an implicit racial prime in the taxation policy experiment and further, does not prime linked fate with whites or white identity. Yet in the taxation case, white respondents in the implicit condition assessed their feelings about their race-mates, and accessed these feelings when assessing the fictitious policy. As such, the middle class identity serves to prime white respondents to consider how they feel about whites – but it is unwise to claim that this trend is universal, as respondents were not similarly primed when they considered jobs or education policy.

**Explicit Racial Priming: An Expanded Understanding**

While there is only mixed evidence that the middle class serves as an implicit racial prime, there is strong evidence that a reference to white identity serves as an explicit racial prime across policy areas. Importantly, it only serves to prime one racial consideration; however, the effect is stronger – though negative – than the implicit priming effect. In this case, while

respondents did not bring their affect toward or linked fate with whites to bear on their decision to support the policy, they did consider white identity, arguably the most personal and individual of the racial considerations under examination.

Table 5 (above) presents the results of three ordinary least squares regressions demonstrating that respondents consider the importance of their own white identities upon hearing a reference to white race. As evidenced by the three statistically significant interaction terms, white identity clearly has a stronger influence on support for the policy in the explicit group than in the control group, driving statistically significant differences in levels of support for the three different proposed policies. This trend not surprising, as explicit racial cues can indeed activate in-group identification (Valentino et al., 2017). Figure 2 (below) provides further insight into patterns of support by presenting the predicted probability of support for the policy across different levels of importance of white identity. While respondents encountering an explicit racial prime are simply less likely to support the policy than respondents not encountering the reference to whites, the probability of support increases with respondents' valuation of their own white identities.



**Figure 2: Respondent Support for Jobs Policy Given Importance of White Identity**

It appears that a reference to white identity (both “Caucasian” and “white”) serves as an explicit racial prime; the effects of the prime are strong, and therefore call into question the idea that an explicit racial appeal may not be efficacious. On the whole, respondents do indeed resist the explicit appeal *unless* they deeply value their own white identity. In other words, the appeal may indeed be useful in mobilizing white voters who deeply connect with their white identity, as these respondents are almost equally as likely to support the policy as respondents in the control and implicit treatment group.

Furthermore, the finding demonstrates that an appeal to the majority racial in-group resonates with respondents who then access feelings about their own identification with that group. As such, explicit racial priming effects can be found not just when one considers animus toward a racial minority group (as demonstrated by prior experimentation), but also when one considers his feelings about or identification with the racial majority.

### **Ideology: Alternative Influence?**

It is likely, however, that characteristics other than racial considerations influence respondents' decisions to support the policy; policy is, by its very nature, ideological, and respondents' ideologies may therefore moderate or even negate the effects of the racial primes on support. It is therefore important to model support while controlling for a respondent's ideology, as well as the interaction of this ideology with each treatment group.


Table 6 (below) presents the results of this ordinary least squares analysis. While the implicit priming effect of affect toward whites remains, it is very small. The explicit priming effect of white identity remains robust even when controlling for ideology across all three experiments. In other words, respondents consider their white identity, which has a stronger influence on their decision to support the policy, when they receive an appeal to white race *regardless* of their ideological persuasion. Figure 3 (below) demonstrates the strength of the priming effect when respondents consider education policy. Indeed, the probability of support among respondents receiving the explicit treatment grows to surpass the support of respondents in the control group even when controlling for the influence of their ideology on support for the policy. In turn, this trend demonstrates the power an explicit racial prime in a campaign message may still have on citizens' decisions to support a policy proposal.

**Table 6: Support for Policy, Controlling for Racial Considerations and Ideology**

	Affect Toward Whites			Linked Fate with Whites			White Identity		
	<i>Tax Cuts</i>	<i>Jobs</i>	<i>Education</i>	<i>Tax Cuts</i>	<i>Jobs</i>	<i>Education</i>	<i>Tax Cuts</i>	<i>Jobs</i>	<i>Education</i>
Implicit Treatment	0.28** (0.10)	-0.07 (0.07)	0.07 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.07)	0.03 (0.07)	0.03 (0.06)	-0.08 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.05)
Explicit Treatment	-0.23* (0.10)	-0.22** (0.07)	-0.02 (0.08)	-0.35*** (0.08)	-0.21*** (0.06)	-0.20** (0.07)	-0.52*** (0.06)	-0.37*** (0.04)	-0.23*** (0.05)
Racial Consideration	0.02* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Racial ConsiderationXImplicit Treatment	-0.00* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Racial ConsiderationXExplicit Treatment	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)
Ideology	0.09*** (0.02)	-0.04*** (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.10*** (0.02)	-0.03** (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.10*** (0.02)	-0.03* (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)
IdeologyXImplicit Treatment	-0.05* (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.06** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.07** (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
IdeologyXExplicit Treatment	-0.05* (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.05* (0.02)	0.08*** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	-0.07** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)
Constant	0.41*** (0.07)	0.65*** (0.05)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.56*** (0.06)	0.68*** (0.05)	0.50*** (0.05)	0.57*** (0.04)	0.78*** (0.03)	0.54*** (0.04)
Observations	700	971	956	701	971	956	699	971	956
R2	0.30	0.21	0.11	0.29	0.20	0.11	0.32	0.21	0.11
P	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

\* $p \leq 0.05$ , \*\* $p \leq 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p \leq 0.001$ .

Note: OLS Standard Errors are displayed in parentheses.



**Figure 3: Respondent Support for Education Policy Given Importance of White Identity and Controlling for Ideology**

### **White Race: An Effective Explicit Racial Prime**

While there is only mixed evidence to show that the middle class identity serves as an implicit racial prime, there is strong evidence that a reference to white race does indeed prime survey respondents to consider their valuation of their own whiteness. When they encounter an explicit appeal to an ostensibly value-neutral – though majority – racial group, white respondents consider the importance of whiteness as part of their identity when evaluating the policy. The implication is that a policy appeal referencing the racial in-group to which respondents belong most certainly primes consideration of their own racial identities. Contrastingly, the appeal did not prime white respondents to consider their feelings toward or connection with whites as a group. Thus, the explicit appeal (to Caucasians) serves to prime more identity-based, personal

racial considerations while the implicit appeal (to the middle class) primes respondents to consider not their own white identity, but their feelings toward whites as a group.

Taken together, these results contribute to a larger discussion on the efficacy of implicit versus explicit racial priming (Huber & Lapinski, 2006; Mendelberg, 2001, 2008). Certainly, the findings demonstrate that an explicit appeal to the majority in-group serves as a racial prime and further, that a racial consideration other than resentment may be primed by this language. However, given the mixed evidence of the utility of the “middle class” as an implicit racial prime, further work is needed to discover other sorts of coded language referring to whiteness. It is therefore unwise to draw conclusions about the relative efficacy of explicit and implicit racial primes connoting white identity – and of considerations other than racial resentment – from this analysis. Yet by examining racial considerations other than resentment, this research helps to further explore the sorts of racial attitudes upon which primes can operate.

The norm of racial equality in the United States has proven difficult to violate in the campaign context since the Civil Rights Movement and the demise of the Southern Strategy. Nonetheless, the contemporary political climate is one of renewed racial unrest. It is therefore important to understand the different potential avenues of race-based mobilization a candidate may consider, and how effective each may be. While it remains to be seen whether a candidate will justify his policy proposals by claiming to work on behalf of whites, there is nonetheless evidence that this strategy could be effective among individuals who truly value their white identity. Yet on the whole, it appears this strategy – like explicitly derogatory language about racial minorities – would be rejected, even in this most tumultuous rhetorical climate.

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## APPENDIX

### Complete Version of In-Text Tables

All analyses in this project were conducted after dropping respondents who did not answer a manipulation check correctly from the sample. Respondents could select one of four options for *gender*: male, female, trans\*, or prefer not to state. There were very few respondents who chose the latter two categories; these respondents were dropped from the analysis. Respondents could pick any of thirteen *income* categories. The lowest was less than \$10,000, and the next was \$10,001-\$19,999; this pattern of ranges continued until the last four categories: \$100,000-\$119,999, \$120,000-\$149,999, and more than \$150,000. *Ideology* was a five-part variable – very liberal, liberal, moderate, conservative, and very conservative – that was re-scaled to range from -2 (very liberal) to 2 (very conservative). Similarly, *party* ranged from Strong Democrat to Strong Republican, with Independent as the neutral category. Respondents could select from seven *race* options (white, Black or African American, Hispanic or Latino, Asian or Asian American, Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, Middle Eastern, or Other). *Age* was a four-part categorical variable: 18-30, 31-44, 45-65, and 65 or over. *Education* was a six-part categorical variable: did not graduate from high school, high school graduate, some college but no degree (yet), 2-year college degree, 4-year college degree, or postgraduate degree (MA, MBA, MD, JD, PhD, etc). *Class* was a six-part variable that was eventually re-scaled into a four-part variable used in the analysis. Respondents could select from lower class, working class, lower middle class, middle class, upper middle class, and upper class; the three middle class categories were re-coded to create the four-part class variable.

**Table A1: Support for Politician and Policy**

	Ordinary Least Squares			Logistic Regression			Ordered Logistic Regression		
	<i>Tax Cuts</i>	<i>Jobs</i>	<i>Education</i>	<i>Tax Cuts</i>	<i>Jobs</i>	<i>Education</i>	<i>Tax Cuts</i>	<i>Jobs</i>	<i>Education</i>
Implicit Treatment	0.06*	-0.04*	0.01	1.69*	0.81	1.10	1.46*	0.66**	2.05
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.35)	(0.23)	(0.18)	(0.36)	(0.10)	(0.15)
Explicit Treatment	-0.30***	-0.25***	-0.12***	0.21***	0.12***	0.50***	0.15***	0.13***	0.46***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.07)
Constant	0.56***	0.75***	0.51***	1.84***	12.54	1.46	-	-	-
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.26)	(2.56)	(0.16)	-	-	-
Cut 1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-1.94	-3.72	-1.75
	-	-	-	-	-	-	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.12)
Cut 2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.69	-2.52	-0.42
	-	-	-	-	-	-	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.11)
Cut 3	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.74	0.59	2.37
	-	-	-	-	-	-	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.15)
Observations	710	981	966	710	981	966	710	981	966
R2	0.24	0.17	0.04	-	-	-	-	-	-
P	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ .

*Note: Ordinary least squares regression employed the scaled variable employed in the main text. The logistic regression used a binary support variable derived from the four-part support variable used for ordered logistic regression. Results of logistic and ordered logistic regression are presented in odds ratios. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses*

All analyses have been replicated with the original ordinal support variable. All results are presented in odds ratios.

**Table A2: Support for Policy, Controlling for Racial Considerations – Ordered Logistic Regression**

	Affect Toward Whites			Linked Fate with Whites			White Identity		
	<i>Tax Cuts</i>	<i>Jobs</i>	<i>Educa tion</i>	<i>Tax Cuts</i>	<i>Jobs</i>	<i>Educa tion</i>	<i>Tax Cuts</i>	<i>Jobs</i>	<i>Educa tion</i>
Implicit Treatment	6.18**	0.47	1.60	0.68	0.60	1.20	1.34	0.50*	0.64
	(4.09)	(0.26)	(0.84)	(0.40)	(0.32)	(0.55)	(0.53)	(0.17)	(0.22)
Explicit Treatment	0.23*	0.07**	0.64	0.10**	0.13**	0.24*	0.04**	0.03**	0.16**
	(0.16)	(0.04)	(0.33)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.05)
Racial Consideration	1.02**	1.01	1.02*	0.99	1.07	1.06	1.13	0.82*	1.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Racial ConsiderationXImplicit Treatment	0.98*	1.00	0.99	1.16	1.02	0.97	1.05	1.13	1.22
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.16)
Racial ConsiderationXExplicit Treatment	0.99	1.01	1.00	1.09	1.00	1.14	1.57**	1.86	1.56**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.10)	*	(0.25)	*
Cut 1	-0.64	-3.34	-0.68	-2.00	-3.36	-1.49	-1.66	-4.25	-1.74
	(0.50)	(0.41)	(0.36)	(0.41)	(0.39)	(0.34)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.25)
Cut 2	0.63	-2.12	0.67	-0.75	-2.16	-0.15	-0.35	-3.02	-0.37
	(0.50)	(0.39)	(0.36)	(0.41)	(0.38)	(0.33)	(0.29)	(0.25)	(0.24)
Cut 3	3.09	1.01	3.49	1.70	0.96	2.65	2.11	0.24	2.46
	(0.51)	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.41)	(0.37)	(0.35)	(0.31)	(0.22)	(0.26)
Observations	710	981	966	710	981	966	708	981	966
P	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

\* $p \leq 0.05$ , \*\* $p \leq 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p \leq 0.001$ .

Note: Results presented are in odds ratios. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses

**Table A3: Support for Policy, Controlling for Racial Considerations and Ideology – Ordered Logistic Regression**

	Affect Toward Whites			Linked Fate with Whites			White Identity		
	<i>Tax Cuts</i>	<i>Jobs</i>	<i>Educa tion</i>	<i>Tax Cuts</i>	<i>Jobs</i>	<i>Educa tion</i>	<i>Tax Cuts</i>	<i>Jobs</i>	<i>Educa tion</i>
Implicit Treatment	5.22*	0.49	1.74	0.76	0.63	1.25	1.07	0.48*	0.76
	(3.58)	(0.30)	(0.95)	(0.44)	(0.35)	(0.61)	(0.45)	(0.17)	(0.29)
Explicit Treatment	0.16** *	0.17**	1.02	0.09** *	0.17** *	0.27* *	0.03** *	0.04** *	0.22** *
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.08)
Racial Consideration	1.01	1.01*	1.01* *	1.01	1.11	1.02	1.01	0.86	0.97
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Racial ConsiderationXImplicit Treatment	0.98	1.00	0.99	1.14	1.01	0.98	1.13	1.15	1.17
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Racial ConsiderationXExplicit Treatment	1.00	1.00	0.99	1.07	0.97	1.15	1.74** *	1.66** *	1.42** *
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.19)
Ideology	1.95** *	0.73** *	1.15	2.01** *	0.77** *	1.21* *	2.02** *	0.80* *	1.22* *
	(0.23)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.23)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.24)	(0.08)	(0.11)
IdeologyXImplicit Treatment	0.70* *	1.05	1.21	0.66** *	1.07	1.17	0.63** *	1.02	1.10
	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.15)
IdeologyXExplicit Treatment	0.70* *	1.94** *	1.61* **	0.70* *	1.95** *	1.53* **	0.62** **	1.70** *	1.39* *
	(0.11)	(0.28)	(0.23)	(0.11)	(0.27)	(0.20)	(0.10)	(0.24)	(0.19)
Cut 1	-1.27 (0.50)	-2.97 (0.43)	-0.91 (0.38)	-2.05 (0.41)	-3.24 (0.41)	-1.77 (0.36)	-2.14 (0.31)	-4.16 (0.29)	-1.96 (0.26)
Cut 2	0.04 (0.50)	-1.75 (0.42)	0.50 (0.38)	-0.75 (0.40)	-2.02 (0.40)	-0.36 (0.36)	-0.80 (0.30)	-2.92 (0.27)	-0.54 (0.26)
Cut 3	2.64 (0.51)	1.47 (0.41)	3/39 (0.40)	1.84 (0.41)	1.18 (0.39)	2.51 (0.37)	1.80 (0.31)	0.29 (0.25)	2.34 (0.28)
Observations	700	971	956	701	971	956	699	971	956
P	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

\* $p \leq 0.05$ , \*\* $p \leq 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p \leq 0.001$ .

Note: Results presented are in odds ratios. Standard errors are displayed in parentheses

### *Influence Of White Identity On Support Using Factor Variable*

To the centrality of white identity and the perceptions of the group’s politicization to white respondents, I used Stata’s factor function to create a new variable. Factor analysis was employed here rather than creating a simple additive index because it allows certain items to have more influence over the index variable than others, creating a more accurate representation of underlying sentiment. Each question asked respondents to indicate “how important” two concepts are: 1) How important is being white to your identity, and 2) How important is it that whites work together to change laws that are unfair to whites? Respondents could select not at all, a little, moderately, very, or extremely. I scaled this variable to set the mean equal to zero and the standard deviation equal to 1. The Eigenvalue for both factors are below zero, meaning there is no underlying latent variable that the combination of these two variables is jointly measuring.